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I. INTRODUCTION
Reasoned opinions count as much or more than outcomes,
partly because “reasoned response to reasoned argument is an
essential aspect of [the judicial] process,”1 and partly because “the
opinion has as one if not its major office to show how like cases are
properly to be decided in the future.”2 Scrutiny of the Supreme
Court’s reasons is called for not only when the result seems
doubtful, but also when the result is intuitively appealing. Weak
reasons may in the long run undermine a holding that deserves a
better foundation than the Court has built for it, or at least distort
and delay the elaboration of doctrine. When the intuition behind
the holding deserves broader application than the Court’s reasons
can support, an effort to identify more convincing reasons is an
especially worthwhile project.
Heffernan v. City of Paterson,3 illustrates the good result/weak
reasons problem. Under settled First Amendment principles, a
public employee may not be fired or demoted for speech on a
matter of public concern, unless the speech threatens to disrupt
the workplace and the disruption outweighs the value of the
speech.4 In Heffernan the Supreme Court dealt with an odd
variation on regulation of public employee speech.
Jeffrey
Heffernan, a police officer, was demoted by the City of Paterson
because his supervisors mistakenly believed he had engaged in
On the facts stipulated by the Court,
protected speech.5
Heffernan’s mother had asked him to pick up a yard sign that
showed support for Spagnola, a mayoral candidate.6 Spagnola’s
opponent, the incumbent, had appointed the current police chief,
James Wittig.7 Other officers spotted Heffernan at the Spagnola
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987).
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960).
3 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016).
4 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that a government employee’s
distribution of an inter-office questionnaire about her employer warranted termination
because it disrupted the workplace); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A]
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the
basis for his dismissal from public employment.”).
5 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
6 Id.
7 Id.
1
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yard-sign distribution site and told his supervisors, who wrongly
inferred that Heffernan was involved in Spagnola’s campaign.8 As
punishment for his supposed advocacy against the current mayor,
Wittig demoted Heffernan from detective to patrol officer.9 Citing
the First Amendment’s protection of public employee speech,
Heffernan sued the city for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10 He
lost in the lower courts.11 They reasoned that, by his own
admission, Heffernan had not engaged in protected speech by
picking up the sign.12
Although Wittig acted with a
constitutionally impermissible motive, his mistake of fact saved
him from liability.13
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of
“[w]hether the First Amendment bars the government from
demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception
that the employee supports a political candidate.”14 The dilemma
presented by the case is that the act of picking up a yard sign, if
done merely as a favor for someone, is not protected speech.15
However unfair it may seem, so far as the Constitution is
concerned, Wittig could have fired Heffernan for that act.16 At the
Id.
Id.
10 Id.
Justice Thomas dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito. Id. at 1420.
Section 1983 is widely used to bring challenges to state government practices for violating
federal constitutional and statutory norms. It authorizes a cause of action against “[e]very
person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or cause to be subjected,
any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). A local government is a
“person” subject to suit under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
As a result a local government could be held liable for the “single decision[s] of municipal
policymakers.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). This could include
the decision of the police chief to demote Jeffrey Heffernan. For more information
regarding § 1983 actions brought against local governments, see generally SHELDON H.
NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 294–313 (4th ed. 2015).
11 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563, 584 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, Heffernan v.
City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2015).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (No. 14-1280).
15 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
16 Id. Some public employees are entitled to a due process hearing before or shortly after
dismissal. On account of the contracts under which they hold their posts, they have a
“property” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924,
928–29 (1997) (stating that “public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a
8
9
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same time, Heffernan was actually fired not because he did a favor
for his mother, but because his supervisors mistakenly thought he
had engaged in protected speech.17 That is a constitutionally
impermissible motive. On the one hand, the case did not involve a
straightforward violation of First Amendment rights. On the
other hand, Chief Wittig ignored basic First Amendment norms.
The Court ruled in Heffernan’s favor, over a dissent authored
by Justice Thomas joined by Justice Alito.18 Yet Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion is quite puzzling. It contains elements of at least
two rationales, but does not adequately support either of them.
First, the Court might have held, as the petition for certiorari
suggested,19 that the city violated Heffernan’s First Amendment
rights. Yet the opinion contains no statement to that effect, the
dissent denies that the Court so held, and Justice Breyer does not
refute that assertion.20 Second, it might have held that the City of
Paterson acted under an unconstitutional policy, since Wittig
acted for a constitutionally impermissible motive. This theory of
the case applies the general rule that local governments can be
held liable under § 1983 for the actions of government policy

constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due
process”). The requirement of “cause” amounts to showing that there is good reason for the
employment decision. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39
(1985) (a contract that guaranteed employment during “good behavior and efficient service”
created a property right). The requirement of cause would probably not be satisfied on
these facts. See Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due
Process of Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 44 GA. L.
REV. 161, 166 (2009) (listing “incompetence, insubordination, criminal misconduct . . . [as]
grounds that would justify dismissal”). But it appears that Heffernan had no such due
process protection. State law may also provide some protection for the employee. See Brief
of New Jersey State League of Municipalities as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
at 5, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280) (stating “New Jersey has afforded protections to
public employees and shielded them from adverse employment decisions rooted in political
influences . . .”).
17 Hefffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
18 Id. at 1419.
The Court remanded the case for consideration of another ground on
which the city may prevail. Id. It noted “some evidence in the record . . . suggesting that
Heffernan’s employers may have dismissed him pursuant to a different and neutral policy
prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign,” and directed
the lower courts to look into “[w]hether that policy existed, whether Heffernan’s supervisors
were indeed following it, and whether it complies with constitutional standards.” Id.
19 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (No. 14-1280).
20 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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makers, a category that probably includes Chief Wittig.21 This
ground was not briefed, did not figure in the lower courts’
resolution of the case, and would entail the overruling of a
Supreme Court precedent.22 The Court devotes no more than
three opaque sentences to it.23 Nonetheless the dissent asserts
that it is the majority’s rationale, and Justice Breyer does not
dispute that claim.24
In this Article, I examine both of these grounds and show that
neither of them is viable, unless the Court is to be understood as
having revised First Amendment or § 1983 doctrine without any
explicit articulation of the changes. I propose two alternate
rationales that avoid the objections to those theories and may
provide a stable foundation for the outcome. One is to shift the
source of the liability rule away from the First Amendment.
Instead, it could be located in federal common law, and more
particularly constitutional common law.25 Viewed in this way,
Heffernan may be understood and defended as a judge-made
principle aimed at enforcement of the constitutional values behind
the public employee speech doctrine. Another strategy is to put
aside the First Amendment aspect of the case in favor of a focus on
Wittig’s arbitrary treatment of Heffernan. Under the Equal
Protection Clause, a “class of one” can recover for an injury by
showing that an official made an irrational distinction, singling
him out for bad treatment.26 The problem with this theory is that

21 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (overruling precedent that
gave immunity to local governments from suit under § 1983).
22 See generally Brief for Petitioner, Heffernan, 123 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280);
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015).
23 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.
24 Id. at 1421–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25 The leading and still authoritative article on this topic is Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975).
26 See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (explaining “an equal
protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged
class-based discrimination, but instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out as
a so-called “class of one”).

6
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the current doctrine may exclude public employees like Jeffrey
Heffernan from its coverage.27
Part II distinguishes between the “violation of First
Amendment rights” and “§ 1983 local government liability”
themes. Parts III and IV discuss each of the two in turn and
explain why neither is adequately supported by the opinion. Part
V suggests that Jeffrey Heffernan’s victory can be justified more
convincingly as an exercise in constitutional common law making
or “class of one” Equal Protection.
II. TWO STRANDS OF REASONING
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion contains elements of two
distinct, though related, rationales for ruling in the plaintiff’s
favor. One of these would be a simple constitutional holding:
Paterson, acting through Wittig, violated Heffernan’s First
Amendment rights by demoting him, and therefore is liable for the
resulting injury. The second would be a bit more complex, because
it brings in a special § 1983 doctrine as well as the First
Amendment: Paterson would be liable under § 1983 for Wittig’s
actions, because Wittig acted for a constitutionally impermissible
motive. We can call the first a “constitutional” ground and the
other a “statutory” ground. It is useful to keep the two separate,
even though they are related in an important sense. At least
under the § 1983 doctrine as it stood before Heffernan, the plaintiff
has been required to prove a violation of his constitutional rights
in order to win on the second theory as well as the first. The Court
so held in Los Angeles v. Heller.28 But the two are conceptually
distinct, in that the § 1983 rationale does not ineluctably entail
showing a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, only
unconstitutional motivation. Thus, one way to read the opinion is
that the Court implicitly overruled Heller and opened the door to
broader municipal liability across the board.

27 See id. at 594 (holding that the “class of one” theory “has no place in the public
employment context”).
28 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam). The possibility that Heffernan has implicitly
overruled Heller is discussed in Part III below.
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A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND

The Court might have, but did not, answer the First
Amendment question presented in Jeffrey Heffernan’s petition for
certiorari with a simple “yes.” Instead of responding to the
question in such a straightforward fashion, Justice Breyer invites
the reader to connect the dots. Near the beginning of the opinion,
Justice Breyer frames the issue by stating, “The question is
whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal
difference. Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in
protected political activity, did his demotion deprive him of a
right . . . secured by the Constitution? 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold
that it did.”29
This passage may be understood as an oblique “yes” in response
to the question presented by the petition for certiorari. Yet the
dissent claims that the Court found no violation of Heffernan’s
constitutional rights.30 The majority opinion does not ever directly
state that Paterson violated Heffernan’s constitutional rights. Nor
does it take issue with the dissent’s assertion to the contrary. Nor
does the majority take advantage of the ample resources provided
by Heffernan’s brief and the amicus brief filed on his behalf by the
Solicitor General to construct a theory of First Amendment public
employee speech that would support such a right. On the other
hand, the possibility that the Court indeed intended to make a
rule of constitutional law cannot be dismissed out of hand.
B. THE STATUTORY GROUND

The Court’s reference to § 1983, along with a passage that
refers to Paterson’s “policy,” suggests a different rationale.31 This
one depends on the presence of the City of Paterson as a
defendant. Monell v. Department of Social Services held that
Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
Id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As in most § 1983 suits, [Heffernan’s] claim could
be that the City interfered with his freedom to speak and assemble. But because Heffernan
has conceded that he was not engaged in protected speech or assembly when he picked up
the sign, the majority must resort to a second, more novel framing. It concludes that
Heffernan states a § 1983 claim because the City unconstitutionally regulated employees’
political speech and Heffernan was injured because that policy resulted in his demotion.”).
31 Id. at 1417 (majority opinion).
29
30
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municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of their
officials.32 But Monell also held that they are not vicariously liable
for all official acts.33 The plaintiff must show that the injury was
caused by an “official policy.”34 As applied to Heffernan, the theory
is that Wittig’s unconstitutional motive is a municipal policy, and
that the faulty policy caused the demotion. Support for this theory
of the case may be found in Justice Breyer’s statement that “[t]he
Government acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy whether
Heffernan did or did not in fact engage in political activity.”35
Moreover, “Heffernan was directly harmed, namely, demoted,
through application of that policy.”36 In this line of reasoning, the
municipal “policy” and the constitutional violation are one and the
same. The crucial element is Wittig’s unconstitutional motivation,
coupled with resulting harm in the form of a demotion.
These two potential rationales may seem on a quick reading to
be alternate ways of saying the same thing. But they are not. The
difference between them is this: The first would hold that the city
violated Heffernan’s First Amendment rights, while the second
would not necessarily do so. Rather, the second rationale would
establish liability under § 1983 by proof that a constitutionally
harmful policy has caused harm, such as Heffernan’s demotion. In
principle, if not in pre-Heffernan practice under Los Angeles v.
Heller, no violation of Heffernan’s constitutional rights would be
required for governmental liability.37 But the distinction between
the two grounds collapses unless we stipulate that the Court has
implicitly overruled or distinguished Heller.
III. HEFFERNAN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The opinion contains no declarative sentence to the effect that
Paterson violated Heffernan’s First Amendment rights, nor even a
rebuttal to the dissent’s charge that the Court did not so hold.
That absence is not due to a failure of advocacy. In support of such
32
33
34
35
36
37

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
Id.
Id.
136 S. Ct. at 1418.
Id. at 1419.
See generally 475 U.S. 796 (1986).
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a right, Jeffrey Heffernan’s lawyers asserted that “[r]espondents
violated the First Amendment by demoting Heffernan because
they perceived that he supported the mayor’s opponent in the
upcoming election.”38 Similarly, the United States filed an amicus
brief in support of Heffernan, in which it maintained that “[a]
public employer violates the First Amendment when, absent
justification, it acts against an employee with the purpose of
suppressing disfavored political beliefs, even if the employer’s
perception of those beliefs is mistaken.”39 Both briefs put forward
reasoned arguments in support of that position. Yet the Court’s
opinion omits any statement that the claimed First Amendment
right exists.
A. THE COURT’S “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” REASONING

The Court’s rhetorical strategy is to invoke the First
Amendment, but without any explicit statement that Heffernan’s
constitutional rights were violated. For example, Justice Breyer
frames the holding by stating, “When an employer demotes an
employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in
political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee
is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”40
This passage seems to invite the reader to construct a
syllogism: (1) § 1983 is available for constitutional violations; (2)
§ 1983 is available to Heffernan; (3) therefore, the City violated
Heffernan’s constitutional right.
One problem with the syllogism is that the availability of § 1983
does not necessarily mean that the right of which the plaintiff has
been deprived is a constitutional right. That statute authorizes
suits to recover for violations of federal “laws” as well as the

38 Brief for Petitioner at 12, Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 141280).
39 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Heffernan v.
City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280).
40 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
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Constitution,41 and “laws” arguably includes federal common law
as well as statutory rights.42 In addition, the proposition that
Heffernan may successfully “challenge . . . unlawful action under
the First Amendment” is not precisely equivalent to the
proposition that Paterson violated Heffernan’s First Amendment
right.43 The Court’s careful language leaves open the possibility
that the specific source of the right being recognized is not the
First Amendment, even though that right promotes First
Amendment values.
Besides the quoted language, the opinion treats the case as one
that raises a public employee speech issue under the First
Amendment and cites the principal cases in the development of
that doctrine, including Pickering v. Board of Education,44 Connick
v. Myers,45 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.46 This “Pickering/Connick”
doctrine, as it is often called, protects employees from adverse
employment actions taken against them for speech on matters of
public concern, unless the potential disruptive impact outweighs
the “public concern” value of the speech.47 Garcetti holds that the
doctrine does not protect speech that is part of the employee’s
job.48 After describing these cases, the Court sets them aside. The
cases “did not present the kind of question at issue here,” because

41 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (noting that
while some statutes preclude § 1983 claims, the Court looks to Congressional intent and the
remedial schemes of a statute to determine if a § 1983 claim is available).
42 See Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Common Law, Section 193, and Heffernan v. City
of Paterson (Aug. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (arguing that
Heffernan’s holding allows courts to make common law rules in order to implement the
First Amendment).
43 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
44 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding a teacher’s letter to a local newspaper regarding a
proposed tax increase was speech from a member of the community about a topic of public
concern).
45 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (finding the discharge of a former assistant district attorney did
not violate the right to free speech).
46 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (finding a district attorney’s speech was not protected under the
First Amendment because he was not speaking as a citizen when he wrote a memo).
47 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 10, at 205–14 (discussing situations in which a public
employee is fired or penalized on account of the employee’s speech).
48 547 U.S. at 421 (stating “when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes. . .”).
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“no factual mistake was at issue.”49 The Court turns instead to
Waters v. Churchill,50 which is “more to the point,” since the
Churchill Court “did consider the consequences of an employer
mistake.”51
In Waters, a nurse at a public hospital was fired after she spoke
with coworkers.52
The supervisors who dismissed her had
investigated the incident but evidently made a mistake of fact,
because they believed that she had discussed only internal issues
that would not trigger Pickering/Connick protection.53 In fact, she
had discussed matters of public concern that met the
Pickering/Connick test.54 Although there was no majority opinion,
the Court upheld the hospital’s decision, and the case is generally
cited for the proposition that a public employee who engages in
protected speech may nonetheless be fired if the dismissal is based
on a supervisor’s reasonable belief that the speech was not
protected.55 Justice Breyer describes it as a case in which
The Court held that, as long as the employer (1) had
reasonably believed that the employee’s conversation
had involved personal matters, not matters of public
concern, and (2) had dismissed the employee because
of that mistaken belief, the dismissal did not violate
the First Amendment.
In a word, it was the
employer’s motive, and in particular the facts as the
employer reasonably understood them, that mattered.
In Waters; the employer reasonably but mistakenly
thought that the employee had not engaged in
protected speech.
Here the employer mistakenly
thought that the employee had engaged in protected
speech. If the employer’s motive (and in particular the

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417 (2016).
511 U.S. 661 (1994).
51 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
52 511 U.S. at 664–65.
53 Id. at 664–66.
54 Id. at 680.
55 Edward J. Valaquez, Waters v. Churchill: Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial
Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1057–58 (1995) (discussing the implications of Waters v. Churchill).
49
50
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facts as the employer reasonably understood them) is
what mattered in Waters, why is the same not true
here? After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose
is normally sauce for the gander.
We conclude that, as in Waters, the government’s
reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here.56
This analogy to Waters, and its rejection of Pickering, Connick, and
Garcetti, is the full extent of the Court’s treatment of public
employee speech doctrine.
B. REASONS TO REJECT THE “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” READING OF
HEFFERNAN

The core principle of the First Amendment public employee
speech doctrine is that the employee should be protected because
he has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern, which
Jeffrey Heffernan did not do.57 Unless the doctrine is reworked to
focus on the employer’s perceptions, as Heffernan and the United
States proposed, it does not support the claimed right. Rather
than adopting a version of the theory offered by Heffernan and the
United States, the Court meets this objection by citing Waters,
another case in which the supervisor acted under a mistake of
fact.58 But the Court’s analogy to Waters does not succeed in
linking the two cases, because the two mistakes are not relevantly
similar.
Moreover, to treat the right recognized in Heffernan as a
constitutional right would have implications beyond the narrow
facts of that case. It would add a level of complexity to the First
Amendment doctrine, by introducing into the matrix of First
Amendment principles a new theme—unconstitutional motivation,
even if the government’s act does not touch protected speech—with
unforeseeable and perhaps ungovernable consequences. This
Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418 (citation omitted).
See Picking v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968) (indicating that a public
official’s statements on matters of public concern are protected under the First Amendment
because of the public interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance”).
58 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
56
57
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hypothesized new doctrine was never clearly articulated in the
Court’s opinion and escaped detection by the dissent. The
following are reasons to question not only the viability of the
purported rule, but also its existence.
1. Public Employee Speech Doctrine. Public employees do not
have an unconditional right to speak as they please and remain
employed by the government.59 This does not mean that they risk
their jobs whenever they speak.
In Pickering v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court held that when the employee has
spoken on a matter of public concern, he has some First
Amendment protection against dismissal or demotion.60 Pickering
is a speech-protective case, but its rationale limits its scope. In
Connick v. Myers,61 the Court reiterated and refined the Pickering
framework. It ruled that “[w]hen employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”62
Under Pickering/Connick, the rationale for First Amendment
protection of public employee speech is that the employee has
spoken on a matter of public concern.63 Even if the employee has
spoken on a matter of public concern, the government may have
Pickering/Connick
adequate grounds for disciplining him.64
requires that the value of the protected speech be balanced against
its actual and potential costs in disrupting the work of the office.65

59 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (discussing both the interests of
the government in limiting the speech of public employees as well as the public employee’s
own right to speech).
60 Id. at 570.
61 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
62 Id. at 146; see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (discussing the “special
value” of public employee speech related to the employment); Heidi Kitrosser, The Special
Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 1 301, 336 (“Judicial review in the
work product context can and should be designed not to second-guess supervisor
assessments of work product quality, but to smoke out retaliation against work product
speech for reasons other than quality.”).
63 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.
64 Connick, 461 U.S. at 150–51.
65 Id.
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If the latter outweighs the former, the employee can be
disciplined.66
Justice Breyer sets these cases aside, since they do not involve
mistake of fact and thus “did not present the kind of question at
issue here.”67 But that is not so. On the contrary, they are directly
relevant to the question presented in Heffernan, because in these
cases the basis for the employee’s First Amendment right is that
the employee has spoken on a matter of public concern.68 Absent
public concern speech, the public employee speech doctrine, as it
has been understood since Pickering, does not apply to the
interaction between the employer and the employee.69 The crucial
fact, which Justice Breyer never directly addresses, is that
Heffernan was not speaking on a matter of public concern.
A cogent argument can be made in support of a different
approach to public employee speech. It involves shifting attention
away from what the employee did or did not do, and turns instead
to the purpose behind the doctrine.70 The purpose of First
Amendment protection of public employee speech on matters of
public concern is to encourage that speech.71 When the supervisor
acts with a bad motive, he often suppresses protected speech. His
motive depends on his perception of the facts. Reasoning along
these lines, Heffernan’s lawyers, as well as the United States as
amici curiae, advanced the view that “[a] First Amendment
retaliation claim is predicated on the employer’s perception of the
employee’s speech or association, and the employer’s decision to
fire or demote the employee because of that perception.”72 Circuit

Id.
Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.
68 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.
69 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
70 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 198
(1988) (arguing that “the most significant aspects of first amendment law can be seen as
judge-made prophylactic rules that exceed the requirements of the ‘real’ first amendment”).
71 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2005) (“[T]he First Amendment protects a
public employee’s political affiliation which caused the dismissal.”).
72 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38, at 14; see also Brief for the United States, supra
note 39, at 11 (“When the government acts with the purpose of suppressing disfavored
political association . . . it violates the First Amendment.”).
66
67
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court precedent was available to support such a holding.73
Whatever the merit of that approach, the key point is that that the
Court did not adopt the “perception” theory of First Amendment
rights, at least not explicitly. It turned instead to the supervisors’
mistake of fact and drew an analogy to the mistake made in
Waters.74
2. The Waters Analogy. In order to rely on Waters, the Court
compares the mistake made in that case to the mistake made in
Heffernan.75 Justice Breyer then asserts that mistake should
function in the same way in the two contexts, since, as he puts it,
“what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.”76
But analogies are treacherous, because their force depends on
relevant similarity between the items that are analogized.77 It is
all too easy to focus on a similarity that is not relevant. That is
the problem here. Since supervisors made mistakes in both, the
two cases are superficially similar.78 But the mistakes relate to
entirely different issues and do not provide the relevant similarity
needed for a powerful argument from analogy.
In Waters, the Court did not have to decide whether or not the
The
plaintiff’s speech was a matter of public concern.79
supervisor’s mistake was relevant to an issue that comes after that
one: the Connick constraint on liability. A majority of the Justices
endorsed the view that the employer’s interests in an efficient
workplace sufficed to justify the firing, even if it was based on a
mistake as to what the employee said.80 The holding in Waters is
that, despite the public concern content of the speech, the
employer’s mistake may be excused, so long as the employer
73 See Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 299–300 (6th Cir. 2012)
(agreeing with the First and Tenth Circuits’ holdings that a retaliation claim can be based
on an employee’s political affiliation which caused the dismissal).
74 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741,
745 (1993) (stating arguments from analogy succeed only if “A and B are ‘relevantly’
similar, and . . . there are not ‘relevant’ differences between them”).
78 Compare Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416, with Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 663
(1994).
79 511 U.S. at 680.
80 Id.
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By contrast, the
undertook a reasonable investigation.81
supervisor’s mistake in Heffernan relates to an entirely different
issue, one that is anterior to the Waters employer-interest issue. It
was a mistake as to whether Jeffrey Heffernan engaged in
protected speech in the first place.82 If he did not, the speechprotective Pickering/Connick doctrine is not triggered.83 There is
no relation between the two issues on which the employers made
mistakes, and no basis for an argument by analogy from the
holding with regard to the Waters mistake to the proper treatment
of the Heffernan mistake. To put this point in a different way,
suppose the Court had adopted the “perception” theory of First
Amendment rights proposed by Heffernan’s lawyer.84 The viability
of that theory neither needs nor benefits from Waters, because
Waters does not address the content of First Amendment rights. It
addresses the content of a good excuse for firing someone who has
already exercised First Amendment rights.85
3. Consequences of a Constitutional Holding. Unless it is
cabined, the “constitutional rights” reading of Heffernan could
morph into a principle, or at least an argument, that
misperception of the facts coupled with unconstitutional
motivation can give rise to a First Amendment violation. That
principle, in turn, may have impact beyond the public employee
speech context. Suppose the police take steps to close down a
movie theater, mistakenly believing that the movies are
constitutionally protected, when in fact they are not. Suppose
officials regulate advertising that they mistakenly believe is
constitutionally protected. Suppose they mistakenly believe that a
planned demonstration on public property is protected, though it is
not. They attempt to suppress it, but fail only because bad
weather keeps the protesters at home. Have they committed
violations of First Amendment rights?
While all of these
hypotheticals could be distinguished from Heffernan, if only on the
Id. at 679–80.
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).
83 See id. at 1423 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “to state a First Amendment
retaliation claim, the public employee must allege that she spoke on a matter of public
concern”).
84 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38, at 12–14.
85 Waters v. Churchill, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 667 (1994).
81
82
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ground that none of them are public employee speech cases, the
“constitutionally impermissible motive” principle would add a new
and potentially troublesome dimension to adjudication of First
Amendment issues. But my point is not that the principle is
unsound. I maintain only that it is implausible to read Heffernan
as having introduced such a potentially broad doctrine into First
Amendment law without laying a foundation for it, articulating it
clearly, exploring its implications and limits, or even responding to
the dissent’s assertion that the Court has done no such thing.
One might avoid these consequences by framing the putative
constitutional right in a somewhat different way. The employee’s
right to speak on a matter of public concern has a corollary: a right
not to speak. Jeffrey Heffernan chose not to speak and was
demoted.86 Therefore, the argument goes, the demotion deprived
him of a constitutional right. As Justice Thomas points out in
dissent, the problem with this line of reasoning is that the plaintiff
in a retaliation claim is obliged to show a causal connection
between the right and the adverse action.87 In the public employee
speech context, causation is determined by identifying the reason
for the adverse employment action.88 Heffernan was not fired
because he exercised his constitutional right not to speak. He was
fired because his supervisor mistakenly believed he had exercised
his constitutional right to speak.89
IV. THE “MUNICIPAL POLICY” GROUND
The First Amendment issue was the sole focus of the lower
courts, the petition for certiorari, and the briefs filed by the parties
and amici.90 But parts of Justice Breyer’s opinion suggest that the
Court treats the case in a rather different way. Under § 1983, a
local government is liable for some, but not all, constitutional

Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
Id. at 1421 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
88 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1976).
89 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
90 See generally Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d,
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 14; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38.
86
87
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violations committed by its officers.91 While there is no respondeat
superior liability, municipalities are liable for acts by officials that
meet the Court’s test for “official policy.”92 The Court may have
intended to base liability on this ground. The dissent so asserts,93
and Justice Breyer does not repudiate that assertion. The
distinctive feature of this theory is that, in principle, it could
succeed without showing a violation of Heffernan’s First
Amendment rights. The problem for this theory is that preHeffernan doctrine does require a violation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.94 Thus, this reading differs from the first
only if the Court has changed the municipality doctrine without
saying so.
A. PATERSON’S UNLAWFUL POLICY

The Court’s discussion of municipal policy is brief, oblique, and
buried deep within the opinion.95 A reader unfamiliar with § 1983
doctrine could easily overlook the significance of certain code
words. The relevant passage follows a brief discussion of the First
Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”96
Turning to the
municipal liability issue, the Court said, in full:
The Government acted upon a constitutionally harmful
policy whether Heffernan did or did not in fact engage
in political activity. That which stands for a “law” of
“Congress,” namely, the police department’s reason for
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Id. at 690. Municipal “custom” is another basis for liability, id. at 690–91, but the facts
do not suggest grounds for finding a custom here and the Court does not rely at all on that
ground.
93 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (discussing the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights).
95 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. In addition, neither the Third Circuit, see 777 F.3d 147
(3d Cir. 2015), nor the District Court, see 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), nor any of the
briefs address this local government liability issue. The only issue presented in the Petition
for Certiorari was “[w]hether the First Amendment bars the government from demoting a
public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political
candidate.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at i.
96 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91
92
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taking action, “abridge[s] the freedom of speech” of
employees aware of the policy. And Heffernan was
directly harmed, namely, demoted, through application
of that policy.97
This passage states a conclusion—that Heffernan was demoted
due to a constitutionally harmful policy—but it leaves out the
doctrinal background of local government liability and the steps
leading to a § 1983 municipal liability holding. While one might
have expected the opinion to include that framework,98 most of
those steps can be discerned, at least in a tentative and
approximate way, by applying settled § 1983 doctrine to the
circumstances of the case. Under that doctrine, municipal “policy”
consists not only of rules of general application, but also includes
the single act of a municipal policymaker.99 The demotion was the
act of Heffernan’s “supervisors,” which included Wittig, the police
chief.100 A plausible reading of the case is that the Court views
Chief Wittig as the policymaker for police department employee
discipline, and that the city’s policy is embodied in the act of
demoting Heffernan.
Since the dismissal was based on a
constitutionally impermissible motive of a final policymaker, it
was based on a constitutionally impermissible policy.
This line of reasoning spells out what the Court must have in
mind in referring to Paterson’s “constitutionally harmful policy”
and the injury to Heffernan “through application of that policy.”101
Spelling it out, however, exposes an ambiguity in the Court’s
rationale: Does the Court mean to hold that the City of Paterson,
through the act of its police chief, violated Heffernan’s
constitutional rights?
Or does it mean to hold that the
Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418–19.
See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other
local government may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a
person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such a
deprivation.”).
99 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). In Pembaur, the Court
rejected the view taken by Justice Powell in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, that “policy” consists only of rules of general applicability.
See id. at 499 (Powell, J., dissenting).
100 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
101 Id. at 1418–19.
97
98
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constitutionally suspect motivation of the police chief—the
“constitutionally harmful policy”—caused an injury, the demotion,
that is not itself a violation of a constitutional right? Both of these
possible answers are dubious under current doctrine. Problems
with the former are discussed in Part III. The next section shows
why the latter falls short, unless the Court means to make new
law on local government liability, without an acknowledgement of
the change.
B. OBSTACLES TO THE “§ 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY” THEORY

The City of Paterson might be liable under § 1983 on the
ground that the demotion was caused by an unconstitutional
official policy, or even, in the Court’s terminology, a
“constitutionally harmful” official policy.102 Starting from the
black letter rule that the single act of a municipality’s final
policymaker is the city’s policy,103 the theory is that the police chief
“acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy.”104 A resulting
injury is also required.105 Despite the First Amendment rhetoric
elsewhere in the opinion, the Court does not meet this prong by an
assertion that Heffernan’s constitutional rights were violated.
Rather, “Heffernan was directly harmed, namely, demoted,
through application of that policy.”106 This statement of the
holding provides yet another reason to doubt the “constitutional
rights” version of the case.
What is more, the municipal liability theory does not, under
settled doctrine, sidestep the need to establish (a) a violation of the
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (b) a causal link between the
policy and the violation of his constitutional rights. Here the
problem is that (a) is missing, unless the discussion in Part II is
mistaken. Thus, the Court’s reluctance to make a forthright
statement that Heffernan’s constitutional rights were violated is
Id. at 1418.
See Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that municipal
liability may arise from a single act of a policymaker, but “the act must come from one in an
authoritative policy making position and represent the official policy of the municipality”).
104 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.
105 Miller, 122 F.3d at 1099.
106 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419.
102
103
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also a problem for the “official policy” rationale. The doctrinal
objection to the § 1983 rationale comes from City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, a case in which the plaintiff was injured by police officers
in the course of an arrest.107 In his § 1983 suit against the officers
and the city, he raised two Fourth Amendment claims: that the
arrest was without probable cause and that the officers used
excessive force.108 As grounds for recovery against Los Angeles, he
“contended that the city and the Police Department had adopted a
policy of condoning excessive force in making arrests,” and
introduced evidence at the trial in support of that assertion.109
The District Court bifurcated the trial.110 In the first trial against
one of the officers, the jury was instructed solely on the
constitutional issues and returned a verdict for the officer.111 The
Supreme Court held that the district judge correctly dismissed the
case against Los Angeles: “If a person has suffered no
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer,
the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized
the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the
point.”112
Justice Thomas’s Heffernan dissent identifies the problem with
the Court’s effort to elide this objection. He points out that an
attempt to violate constitutional rights is not by itself a violation of
those rights.113 Here the attempt to violate a right did result in
some injury, the demotion.114 But proof that the plaintiff was
harmed by the demotion does not amount to proof that his
constitutional right was violated. Since the demotion did not
violate a constitutional right, it was not “the right kind of

475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam).
Id.
109 Id. at 801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 797.
111 Id. at 798.
112 Id. at 799. The issue here is whether the case can proceed against Los Angeles, given
the finding of no constitutional violation. Whether the district court’s ruling on the
constitutional issue is correct is a distinct issue, which can be raised on appeal.
113 See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1422 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The mere fact that the
government has acted unconstitutionally does not necessarily result in the violation of an
individual’s constitutional rights, even when that individual has been injured.”).
114 Id.
107
108
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injury,”115 but was instead a non-constitutional consequence of the
failed attempt.
Perhaps the Court meant to overrule or in some way
distinguish Heller without discussion of the earlier case, much less
an explanation of why it should be repudiated or distinguished.
Indeed, this “municipal liability based on a policymaker’s bad
motive” rationale is in some respects a more plausible account of
the case than the “constitutional rights” thesis. The dissent
describes the majority opinion as a municipal liability ruling, and
the majority does not dispute that description.116 Although Justice
Thomas protests that Heffernan did not suffer the right kind of
injury, he does not cite Heller. That omission may be significant.
As precedent, Heller is a candidate for reconsideration, if only
because it was a summary disposition by a per curiam opinion
without briefing or argument.117 The Heller holding drew a
dissent from Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall.118
On the other hand, the “municipal policy” reading of Heffernan
is based on just three sentences in the opinion, none of which
actually refer to the § 1983 local government liability doctrine they
purportedly apply. Neither the lower courts nor the parties nor
the amici addressed either local government liability or Heller.119
If the Court did overrule or distinguish Heller, it did so sub
silentio, which is neither the usual practice nor a recommended
one.120 A more likely explanation for the structure and content of
the Heffernan opinion is that the majority set out to find in favor of
Jeffrey Heffernan, but it wanted to make as little law as possible
in reaching that result. It did not intend to overrule or distinguish
Heller, and it did not intend to recognize a novel First Amendment
Id.
Compare id. (discussing municipal liability), with id. at 1416–19 (majority opinion)
(failing to refute the dissent’s characterization).
117 Heller, 475 U.S. at 797.
118 Id. at 800–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also dissented separately to
object to the summary disposition. Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 See generally Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d,
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015); Brief for Petitioner, supra note
38; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 39.
120 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–38
(1987) (arguing judges should give reasons for their decisions so that they “can be debated,
attacked, or undefended”).
115
116
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principle either. With this set of goals and constraints in mind,
Justice Breyer cobbled together an opinion that consists largely of
rhetorical sleight of hand, gaps in reasoning on the § 1983 issue,
subtle evasions of the constitutional issue, and the Waters red
herring.
V. TWO ALTERNATE PATHS TO THE RESULT
The disconnect between the intuition that Jeffrey Heffernan
ought to win and the weakness of the Court’s opinion may simply
mean that the Justices were divided on the merits of the
“perception” theory of the First Amendment advanced by
Heffernan and the United States. Another possibility is that the
Court could not find a way to bridge the gap between the intuition
that Jeffrey Heffernan should win and the absence of means at
hand to achieve that goal without creating more problems later.
For either of these reasons, the Court may have chosen to cope
with its dilemma by issuing a vague and fragmentary opinion that,
by design, would have little impact on future litigation.
But the Court’s kernel of insight—that Jeffrey Heffernan was
treated unfairly and ought to win—deserves further development
for the benefit of others who find themselves in a similar
predicament. The disconnect should prompt efforts to construct a
more convincing rationale. One possibility is to sidestep the
objections to the “First Amendment right” ground by shifting the
source of the right from constitutional law to federal common law,
more specifically, to “constitutional common law.” Another is to
focus on a different aspect of the case. Even if free speech values
were not at issue, Wittig’s demotion of Heffernan would be
objectionable, simply because it was arbitrary and unjustified. In
principle, Heffernan may have a good Equal Protection claim,
though certain features of current Equal Protection doctrine may
foreclose it. If Jeffrey Heffernan had chosen to pursue that route,
his case would have presented an opportunity for modifying those
limits on the Equal Protection theory.
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW

By “constitutional common law,” I mean the “substructure of
substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various
constitutional provisions.”121 Viewed in this way, Heffernan may
be understood and defended as a judge-made principle aimed at
enforcement of the constitutional values behind the public
employee speech doctrine. But the holding that Heffernan is
entitled to sue under § 1983 does not have the status of a
constitutional holding, which would carry with it further
implications for other areas of First Amendment doctrine. Nor is
such a federal common law right vulnerable to the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” which charges that judicial intervention
by means of rulings on constitutional law is anti-democratic
because the legislature and the executive cannot revise
constitutional rulings.122 As a common law rule, Heffernan’s right
to sue would be subject to both legislative and judicial
modification.
Constitutional common law is a variant of federal common law.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”123 But on the same day, in Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., the Court held that
“whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned
between . . . two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be
conclusive.”124 In the decades since Hinderlider, the Court has
made federal common law in an array of situations in which
federal interests were at stake, including admiralty,125 foreign

Monaghan, supra note 25, at 2–3.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962) (stating
“when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an
elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people”).
123 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
124 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
125 E.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970) (holding that a
wrongful death action under federal maritime law is maintainable for breach of maritime
duties in order to “assure uniform vindication of federal policies”).
121
122
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affairs,126 U.S. government contracts,127 and filling in gaps in
federal statutes.128 In each of these contexts, some national
interest justifies the creation of a federal common law rule.
In constitutional common law, the national interest is the
enforcement of constitutional values. For example, the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring constitutional
violations.129 But there is no constitutional right on the part of a
criminal defendant to have illegally obtained evidence excluded
from consideration.130 Whether to apply it in a given situation
depends on a weighing of costs and benefits.131 In Stone v. Powell,
for example, the issue was whether to allow a state prisoner to
assert violation of Fourth Amendment rights in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding.132 In his criminal trial in state court, the
prisoner had asserted the illegality of a search that produced
evidence leading to his conviction, and had thus sought to have the
evidence excluded from the jury’s consideration.133 The state court
denied the Fourth Amendment claim and he was convicted.134 He
then brought a federal habeas corpus action to challenge the
constitutional validity of his conviction, on the ground that the
evidence was obtained by a search that violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.135 The Court said that the aim of the
exclusionary rule is “the deterrence of police conduct that violates
Fourth Amendment rights,” that “the application of the rule has

126 E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436–37 (1964) (holding that
the act of state doctrine applies to a foreign expropriation because it serves “both the
national interest and progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among
nations”).
127 E.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (holding federal law can
shield contractors from liability for design defects in military equipment because state laws
can present “ ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced”).
128 E.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(interpreting the Sherman Antitrust Act, stating Congress “expected the Courts to give
shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition”).
129 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 222, 236 (2011) (discussing deterrence and
the Fourth Amendment).
130 Monaghan, supra note 25, at 4 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).
131 See id. at 3–6.
132 428 U.S. 465, 465 (1976).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are
thought most efficaciously served,” and that its application to any
“particular context” depends on balancing its costs against its
deterrent value.136 Turning to the habeas context, the Court
stated that the cost of the application of the rule was great,
because it “deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the
guilty.”137 On the other side of the balance, the additional
deterrent effect of applying the rule on habeas would be small,
because the police already face the risk that evidence will be
excluded at trial.138 Thus, “the additional contribution, if any, of
the consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners
on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.”139
Another prominent example is the doctrine stemming from
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,140 in which the Court created a cause of action to
recover damages for Fourth Amendment violations committed by
federal officials.141 Yet today the limits on that cause of action
make it clear that access to that cause of action rule is not a
matter of constitutional right. It may be denied if some other
roughly similar remedy is available, or if “special factors
counseling hesitation” weigh heavily against it.142 The most recent
cases are Wilkie v. Robbins143 and Minneci v. Pollard.144 Wilkie
denied a Bivens remedy to a landowner who complained about
federal officials who, in an effort to induce him to grant the
government an easement, interfered with his property rights by
various acts of petty harassment.145 The special factors counseling
hesitation included “the difficulty of defining limits to legitimate
zeal on the public’s behalf in situations where hard bargaining is
to be expected in the back-and-forth between public and private

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 486–88 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 493.
Id.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
See Monaghan, supra note 25, at 23–24.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
551 U.S. 537 (2007).
132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
555 U.S. at 537.
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interests that the Government’s employees engage in every day.”146
In Minneci a federal inmate held in a private prison was denied a
Bivens remedy because, in the Court’s view, state tort law
provided an adequate remedy for an inmate at a privatelymanaged federal prison who complained about his medical
treatment.147
1. A Constitutional Common Law Rationale for Heffernan.
Both Bivens and the exclusionary rule are concerned with
constitutional remedies.148 Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in
Heffernan evokes a remedial theme as well, though in the context
of recognizing a substantive right. After the Waters analogy and
the shadowy references of municipal policy, Justice Breyer turns to
“the constitutional implications of a rule that imposes liability.”149
Justice Breyer points out that
The constitutional harm at issue in the ordinary case
consists in large part of discouraging employees—both
the employee discharged (or demoted) and his or her
colleagues—from
engaging
in
protected
activities. . . . The upshot is that a discharge or
demotion based upon an employer’s belief that the
employee has engaged in protected activity can cause
the same kind and degree, of constitutional harm
whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual
mistake.150
The imposition of liability will deter these impermissibly
motivated employment actions and thus further First Amendment
values, just as the exclusionary rule deters illegal searches and the
Bivens doctrine deters federal officers from violating a range of
constitutional rights.
In support of its “constitutional harm” reasoning, the Court
cites Gooding v. Wilson,151 a case decided under the First
146
147
148
149
150
151

Id. at 554.
132 S. Ct. at 624–25.
See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (discussing the exclusionary rule).
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016).
Id. at 1419.
405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
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Amendment overbreadth doctrine.152 That doctrine deals with a
danger presented by regulatory statutes that sweep too broadly, in
a way that goes beyond the permissible scope of the government’s
police power.153 Overbroad statutes are problematic because they
cover not only matters the government is empowered to regulate
but protected speech as well.154 In such a case, a litigant whose
acts are regulated by the statute may challenge the provision on
First Amendment grounds, even if his own conduct is not protected
by the First Amendment.155 In Gooding, an anti-war demonstrator
threatened to kill a police officer and was convicted under a state
law that broadly prohibited “opprobrious words or abusive
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace.”156 The Court
did not discuss the facts and did not decide whether the
defendant’s words were or were not constitutionally protected.
Instead it focused on the breadth of the statute, found it faulty on
free speech grounds, and affirmed the overruling of the
conviction.157 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan explained
that, when states regulate speech, litigants may attack “overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”158 The
underlying policy is that the overbroad statute will have a chilling
effect on protected speech, so much so that even someone whose
words are not protected should be allowed to object to it, in order
to eliminate the chilling effect sooner rather than later.159
Justice Breyer cites Gooding in order to stress a similarity
between the overbreadth context and Heffernan’s mistake of fact
Hefferman, 136 S. Ct. at 1419.
See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 530–31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
overbreadth doctrine allows courts to invalidate statutes with language resulting in
“application . . . beyond constitutional bounds”).
154 See id. (discussing the potential for overly broad statutes to deter First Amendment
speech).
155 See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1347 (19th ed.
2016) (explaining that “overbreadth is an exception to the usual rules of standing”).
156 405 U.S. at 519.
157 Id. at 521–22, 528.
158 Id. at 521 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
159 See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 155, at 1347 (indicating that concern for the
chilling effect motivates counts to use the overbreadth analysis).
152
153
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problem.160 In both, someone challenges official action taken
against him, and a ruling for or against the challenge would
enhance or diminish the protection of speech. Because the two are
not precisely parallel, the Court uses a “cf.” signal for the Gooding
citation.161 According to The Bluebook, the “cf.” signal stands for
the proposition that “[c]ited authority supports a proposition
different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to
lend support.”162 The evident point of the signal in this context is
to indicate that the two situations—overbreadth and the Heffernan
rule—differ in the way a chilling effect is produced. Just as
someone may challenge an overbroad statute in order to protect
speech, even though his own conduct is not constitutionally
protected, so also someone who is demoted on account of a
supervisor’s impermissible motive should be allowed to challenge
the demotion in order to dissuade governments from acting on
such motives, even though he did not engage in protected speech
at all. The ultimate aim of both rules is to encourage the system of
free speech.
The overbreadth doctrine illustrates a more general theme.
The First Amendment is more than a source of individual rights.
Freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press are necessary to
proper functioning of our system of government, which is based in
part on popular sovereignty.163 In order to participate effectively
in public affairs, citizens need access to information.164 They also
need to be able to discuss issues freely and share information with
others, and to do so without fear of punishment.165 This “selfgovernment” rationale is among the strongest justifications for
protecting rights of speech, press, and assembly. It is the driving
force behind the watershed ruling in New York Times v.

Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016).
Id.
162 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a) (Columbia Law Review Ass’n
et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). Law review editors typically force authors to include an explanatory
parenthetical after a “cf.” cite. Justice Breyer is not subject to that sort of oversight.
163 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323–25 (1816) (noting the
Constitution of the United States was not established by the states, but by the people).
164 See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 155, at 936–38 (noting the importance of free
speech in self government).
165 Id.
160
161
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Sullivan166 that public officials may not recover for defamation
unless they show that the defamatory statement was made with
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.167
Four years after New York Times, the Court relied on that
theme in Pickering v. Board of Education,168 the leading public
employee speech case. Writing for the Court in Pickering, Justice
Marshall cited New York Times and reiterated “[t]he public
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.”169 He then noted that “dismissal from public
employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech.”170 On this
basis, Pickering held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak
on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his
dismissal from public employment,” unless the teacher makes
knowingly or recklessly false statements.171 The Heffernan opinion
touches on the systemic role of freedom of speech. Though Justice
Breyer does not discuss First Amendment theory, he takes pains
to point out that the phrasing of the First Amendment does not
simply articulate individual rights against government. Instead,
the language targets Congress and, by extension, all of
government, which “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech.”172
Federal common law always runs the risk of giving federal
judges too much leeway to make rules on topics that are best left

376 U.S. 254, 280–83 (1964).
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of
the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1965) (noting knowledge of falsity as an
important qualification to “the New York Times principle”); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New
York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT.
REV. 191 (commenting that “[t]he touchstone of the First Amendment has become the
abolition of seditious libel and what that implies about the function of free speech on public
issues in American democracy”).
168 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
169 Id. at 573.
170 Id. at 574.
171 Id.
In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), the Court qualified this rule,
holding that the government can fire the employee for sufficiently disruptive speech, even if
the speech is on a matter of public concern and not at all defamatory.
172 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. I).
166
167
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to Congress or the states.173 The systemic value of public employee
speech furnishes a response to that critique. Whatever the
appropriate scope of constitutional common law rights may be in
other constitutional domains, the self-government rationale for
protecting speech supports Heffernan, which reaches official acts
that do not themselves violate constitutional rights but
nonetheless threaten speech on matters of public concern. Thus,
the systemic value of the First Amendment not only helps to
justify the recognition of a common law right in Heffernan but also
provides a rationale for limits on the extension of substantive
constitutional common law rights beyond the category of “speech of
matters of public concern.” Other constitutional doctrines may not
warrant the creation of common law rights. Consider, for example,
the First Amendment protection of commercial speech, or the
protection of sexually oriented speech that is neither obscene nor
child pornography. Arguably, these norms do not relate to selfgovernment or any other systemic value, but are strictly individual
rights. If that characterization is correct, it could be argued that
the Constitution both defines those rights and sets their outer
limits. On that view, judicial creation of constitutional common
law rights in those contexts would exceed the legitimate authority
of the judiciary.174 But that objection to constitutional common
law rights does not apply to judge-made rules that limit regulation
of public employee speech on matters of public concern.
2. Constitutional Common Law and § 1983. Heffernan sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.175 Both the majority and the dissent seem
to take the position that he had to assert a violation of a
constitutional right in order to use that statute.176 The Court

Monaghan, supra note 25, at 11.
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (1978) (questioning the authority of the Court to protect
constitutional liberties beyond constitutional minima by imposing rules on “state courts and
state officials . . . grounded not in the constitutional rights . . . but rather in a
subconstitutional calculation of costs and benefits”).
175 Heffernan 136 U.S. at 1416.
176 Id. at 1417, 1422. While some federal statutory rights can also be vindicated in § 1983
suits, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (finding the plain language of the phrase
“and laws” in § 1983 includes violations of the Social Security Act), Heffernan did not seek
recovery for a statutory violation and there seems to be no applicable federal statutory
173
174
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frames the issue in a way that suggests that Heffernan either wins
on constitutional grounds or not at all by saying “the question is
whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal
difference. Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in
protected political activity, did his demotion ‘deprive’ him of a
‘right . . . secured by the Constitution’? 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold
that it did.”177
This way of putting the question invites the reader to infer that
Heffernan could win only if he proved a violation of his
constitutional rights. Since he did win, it seems to follow that he
did prove a violation of his constitutional rights. The dissent
starts from the same premise, that “§ 1983 does not provide a
cause of action for unauthorized government acts that do not
infringe the constitutional rights of the § 1983 plaintiff.”178 The
dissent finds no constitutional violation and concludes that
Heffernan should lose.179
Both the majority and the dissent ignore a third alternative.
The Court’s quotation from § 1983 is incomplete and does not state
the full scope of the statute’s reach. After “Constitution,” it
continues on, to include “laws.”180 That term denotes that the
§ 1983 cause of action is not limited to litigation that alleges
constitutional violations. Maine v. Thiboutot held that § 1983 can
The viability of a
be used to enforce federal statutes.181
constitutional common law reading of Heffernan depends on
whether the “laws” doctrine can be extended to cover a common
law right.182 This is an open question, as the Court does not often
engage in the kind of constitutional common law making that
Heffernan may illustrate. In a somewhat analogous context,
however, the Court has accorded federal common law the same
right. 136 U.S. at 1416. Nonetheless, the doctrine on these suits for violation of federal
“laws” is relevant to Heffernan, as will become apparent in the ensuing paragraphs.
177 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.
178 Id. at 1422 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179 See id.
180 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
181 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
182 The dissent shows that the Court’s “constitutional right” reasoning is dubious, points
out that there is no statute granting the right plaintiff asserts, and declares victory. But,
like the majority, it ignores this possibility. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1422 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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status as federal statutes. Federal statutory causes of action can
be brought in federal court under the “federal question”
jurisdiction of those courts, which authorizes federal district court
jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of
the United States.”183 In Illinois v. Milwaukee the issue was
whether federal common law causes of action are also covered by
the federal courts’ jurisdiction over federal questions.184 The Court
rejected a distinction between statutory law and common law. It
saw “no reason not to give ‘laws’ its natural meaning, and
therefore conclude[d] that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory
origin.”185
In light of Illinois v. Milwaukee and the “laws” language in
§ 1983, the Court probably would not distinguish between federal
common law rights and federal statutory rights for the purpose of
§ 1983 either. But another step is required in order to justify
access to § 1983 for constitutional common law claims. That
statute cannot be used to assert all federal statutory violations.
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Association ruled that two requirements must be satisfied.186 The
§ 1983 remedy is not available if “the statute at issue [is not] the
kind that created enforceable ‘rights’ under § 1983,” or if “Congress
had foreclosed private enforcement” of the statute.187 No doubt
these requirements would also apply to constitutional common
law. After all, the rationale for allowing access to § 1983 is that
constitutional common law should get the same treatment as
federal statutes.
Both prongs favor access to § 1983 on the facts of Heffernan. In
order to show why, a bit of background information is needed. The
“enforceable right” prong typically trips up plaintiffs who try to
rely on federal programs that grant money to state governments
and impose restrictions on how it is used. For example, the
Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974 (FERPA)

183
184
185
186
187

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
406 U.S. at 98–101 (1972).
Id. at 100.
453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981).
Id.
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requires schools that receive federal funding to keep student
records confidential.188 In Gonzaga University v. Doe, a student
charged that the university violated FERPA by disclosing charges
that he had sexually assaulted another student.189 FERPA
contains no authorization of private enforcement.190 The student
brought a § 1983 “laws” suit, seeking damages under a provision of
the statute that provided “[n]o funds shall be made available
under any applicable program to any educational agency or
institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release
of education records . . . of students without the written consent of
their parents to any individual, agency, or organization . . . .”191
The Court held that this language did not create enforceable
rights. It noted, among other things, that the provision was
directed at the Secretary of Education, so that the focus was “two
steps removed from the interests of individual students . . . and
clearly does not confer the sort of individual entitlement that is
actionable under § 1983.”192 By contrast, a provision in the
Medicaid Act, which provided that “[a] State Plan for medical
assistance must provide for making medical assistance
available”193 to certain persons, was “precisely the sort of ‘rightscreating’ language identified in Gonzaga as critical to
demonstrating a congressional intent to establish a new right.”194
On its face, Heffernan’s recognition of a constitutional common law
right to recover damages for a demotion would satisfy this
“enforceable right” requirement.
The second prong is generally treated as a default rule in favor
of access to § 1983 unless a given statute provides a remedy that is
meant to be exclusive. For example, the plaintiff in City of Rancho
Palos Verdes v. Abrams sought to sue under § 1983 for a violation
of the Telecommunications Act, which limits local zoning authority

188
189
190
191
192
193
194

Id. at 280, 292.
536 U.S. 273, 277 (2002).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 277–79 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1) (2012)).
Id. at 274–75.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2016).
S.D. v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004).
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over cellphone towers.195 Since the Telecommunications Act itself
provided a remedy, albeit a more restrictive one than § 1983, the
Court confined him to that remedy.196 The constitutional common
law reading of Heffernan does not raise this issue, simply because
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a judge-made right rather than a
statute.197 Therefore, Heffernan does not encounter any statutory
remedial scheme that might displace § 1983.
In short, a
conception of Heffernan liability as a constitutional common law
right would require a novel holding that § 1983 authorizes
litigation to enforce such rights, but there is ample authority to
support such a holding.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION

The intuition that Jeffrey Heffernan ought to have a remedy
has two sources—not only free speech values but also arbitrary
treatment by supervisors. Throughout the Heffernan litigation,
the parties and the courts centered their attention on the First
Amendment.198 But the injustice of the demotion results at least
as much from the lack of any good reason for it, especially after
Heffernan told his supervisors that they were mistaken, as he
claimed to have done in his testimony at trial.199 Putting the
public employee speech issue aside, the case suggests that Chief
Wittig acted arbitrarily and capriciously toward Heffernan. In
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech the Court said that its doctrine on
Equal Protection includes a “class of one” theory, which applies to
situations “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and

195 544 U.S. 113, 115–18 (2005). See also Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S.
246, 255 (2009) (allowing use of § 1983 to enforce rights under Title IX, and distinguishing
Rancho Palos Verdes on the ground that the Title IX remedial scheme was far less elaborate
than that of the Telecommunications Act).
196 Id. at 127.
197 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).
198 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567–69 (D.N.J. 2014) (highlighting
that through the procedural history of the case, freedom of association and freedom of
speech were major issues).
199 See id. at 573. Heffernan had evidently persuaded the jury of his version of the facts,
as it awarded him $105,000 in damages. Id. at 567–68.
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that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”200
In Willowbrook the plaintiffs claimed that the village had
demanded a 33-foot easement to connect their property to the
municipal water supply, though it had sought only an 18-foot
easement from other property owners.201 The Court ruled that an
Equal Protection violation could be established by proof that there
was no good reason for the difference.202 The underlying principle
is that “ ‘the purpose of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the
State’s
jurisdiction
against
intentional
and
arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute
or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ”203
If Heffernan could show that Chief Wittig had no other reason
for the demotion other than the Chief’s own mistaken impression,
he might well be able to prove that he had been treated differently
from others without a rational basis. The theory is plausible
because it seems unlikely that Wittig could have become chief of
police or remained in that position if he routinely engaged in this
approach to personnel management. The circumstances of the
case reinforce the argument. Chief Wittig had been appointed by
the current mayor.204 Spagnola was the current mayor’s opponent
in the upcoming election.205 Heffernan’s mother asked for a
Spagnola yard sign. Heffernan acknowledged his own friendly
relations with Spagnola.206 These facts support Heffernan’s “no
rational basis” charge, for a jury may well be persuaded that
Wittig acted out of animus toward him, not because of speech but
merely because Heffernan was a friend of Wittig’s political
enemy.207

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 563.
202 Id. at 564.
203 Id. (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441 (1923)).
204 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Cf. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 565–66 (Breyer, J., concurring in the result)
(arguing that the presence of vindictiveness, animus, or ill will “is sufficient to minimize
any concern about transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of constitutional
right”).
200
201
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Despite the attractions of the “class of one” approach,
Heffernan’s lawyer did not pursue it. The problem is the holding
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture.208 In Engquist a
supervisor eliminated the plaintiff’s position in the Department of
Agriculture and promoted her rival.209 The plaintiff sued on a
“class of one” theory, on the ground that she was fired for
“arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.”210 The Court did
not reject her claim on its facts. It issued a sweeping rule that the
“class of one” theory “has no place in the public employment
context.”211 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained
that some areas of state action, including public employment,
“involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of
subjective, individualized assessments.”212 Since “employment
decisions are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on
a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and
quantify,” the “class of one” theory “is simply a poor fit in the
public employment context.”213
This language raises a big hurdle to the Equal Protection cause
of action in a case like Heffernan. But the language is more
general than it needed to be to resolve cases like Engquist. The
problem in Engquist was that “class of one” suits interfere with
government supervisors’ need for discretion in choosing among
employees for promotion or dismissal.214 That is a recurring
situation in every government office. It is one that is guaranteed
to produce friction and hurt feelings. A rule that allows a
disgruntled employee or former employee to sue would
significantly hinder the efficient operation of government offices
because employees who are passed over will often feel that
supervisors have treated them unfairly. Constitutional litigation
in the federal courts may not be the optimal way of resolving such
disputes.
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553 U.S. 591 (2008).
Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 607.

38

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1

By contrast, the “mistake of fact” issue in Heffernan does not
involve the exercise of discretion when choosing among employees.
It will probably arise much less often. In particular, it seems
unlikely that many supervisors would decline to reverse a
demotion upon learning of their mistaken premise. Jeffrey
Heffernan may have been able to show that he was targeted for
unfair treatment, not because he expressed his political beliefs,
but because he was a friend of Wittig’s political adversary, or
merely because his mother supported that adversary. Heffernan’s
case might be distinguished from Engqusit on this ground, though
doing so would require the Court to walk back the broad language
of the Engquist opinion.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some legal scholarship criticizes judicial reasoning in order to
undermine the rule a court has imposed or the result a court has
reached. This Article takes a different approach. It finds fault
with the reasons offered by the Court in Heffernan, but does not
take issue with Jeffrey Heffernan’s victory. For the sake of the
development of doctrine over time, it is essential to raise questions
about the Court’s reasoning, and all the more so when the result is
warranted. Our collective ambition should be to come up with
“[i]deas which will stand the test of time as instruments for the
solution of hard problems . . . .”215
If the rationale for the
Heffernan holding is weak, the case may have little impact outside
of its narrow facts. Yet the rule announced in Heffernan seems
worthy of extension to similar fact patterns. The task is to build a
more solid foundation for it than is provided by the Court’s
makeshift opinion. For this reason, it seems worthwhile to
attempt to justify the outcome by looking outside the opinion for
more persuasive alternatives.
In my view, the holding might be extended in either of two
directions, depending on which of two alternate rationales is
adopted.
I have suggested that the difficulties with the
“constitutional right” and “local government liability” theories
215 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 100 (1959).
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could be overcome by locating the right in federal common law
instead of either the First Amendment or § 1983. Another
approach is to de-emphasize the free speech dimension of the case
and come to the problem from a different angle. Thus, Jeffrey
Heffernan might have won under the “class of one” theory of
recovery under the Equal Protection clause, had he persuaded the
Court to limit the unduly broad language of Engquist.

